



Expanding War and Death

The Kaiser's telegram had reached the returning troops at the edge of the Kalahari Desert. It had taken some time before news from the Battle at Seatsub deep in British Bechuanaland east of German Southwest Africa had made it to Berlin. Now, in mid-March 1908, a note from Wilhelm II spoke of his majesty's "great pride, accompanied by profound grief given the loss of officers and men." The emperor highlighted that the Germans had defeated the enemy and died as heroes. One of the dead he mentioned by name, Hauptmann Friedrich von Erckert. He was, to follow the note, "one of the best and knightly officers of the colonial troops."¹ Countless newspapers agreed, publishing heroic obituaries and stories of bravery in a faraway desert space.² Erckert, a logistical mastermind in the opinion of many contemporaries, had relied on camels to reach into the Kalahari Desert. There, one of the last insurgents still fighting against German control, the captain of the Franzman (or Fransman) Nama, Simon Kooper (also Kopper, Cooper), had found hideouts. Reluctantly supporting the Germans in the late 1800s, Kooper had joined the rebellion of Hendrik Witbooi and others. They had witnessed Germany's brutal warfare against the Herero. Whereas Witbooi died in battle in 1905, and although the war had officially ended in March 1907, Kooper continued his raids from bases deep in the desert. In June 1905 he presumably attacked a small group of Germans and killed the guide Robert Duncan. Erckert thus prepared to reach him, relying on more than seven hundred camels in the so-called Kalahari Expedition. Leaving in early March, they trekked eastward, eventually crossing the border into British Bechuanaland. They did not care. After some time they found one of Kooper's *werfts* and attacked in the morning hours of March 13.³ Newspapers saw the battle as a success against nature and its people, with one publication speaking of "a major but dearly bought victory."⁴ The official military history portrayed von Erckert as a martyr.⁵ German writer Hans Grimm, the author of *Volk ohne Raum*, a book that later fueled Nazi visions of living space, later immortalized that heroic narrative.⁶ The Germans had indeed killed fifty-eight Franzman, including women and children; the rest fled, leaving behind live-

stock the Germans then killed as well. Yet the fact that Kooper had escaped prior to the actual battle indicated that war would drag on even longer.

The events that unfolded in the Kalahari Desert in March 1908, including how those would be framed within colonial narratives, are at the center of chapter 6. The shift of the war southward yet again exposed German logistical problems. The Battle of Waterberg and German efforts to push the Herero population into the desert defined the early part of the war; the resistance of Nama groups, among others, then gave Germans additional headaches. A non-human agent in the shape of a shipworm disrupted access once again while African forced labor continually compensated for such disturbances. The war in the south then more directly exposed German inabilities to supply their troops. To follow Kuss, as the war shifted, fighters could more easily melt “into the apparently never-ending hinterland, where they could survive for long periods.”⁷ According to other historians, “Many mornings the Germans would wake to discover that the trails left by the Nama’s horses had been blown away by the strong winds that always seemed to accompany sunset.”⁸ The construction of a railway, built through mobile sand dunes and arid desert landscapes by forced laborers shows the role of multiple agents. War then officially ended in March 1907. Yet some African groups continued to operate, and the Germans eventually employed camels to reach them. “The import and breeding of these animals,” to follow one scholar, “was one of the few attempts made to adapt the equipment of the Schutztruppe to the demands of the land.”⁹ Yet it also captured German desperation at a time when African combatants employed inaccessible mountains and arid borderlands to sustain themselves. The focus thus remains on environmental infrastructure as an instrument of war and resistance, shaped by ingenuity, labor, non-human agents, and natural forces.

Chapter 6 is divided into three parts. The first section continues to track the struggles surrounding access. With debates lingering among decision-makers about the future of the *Mole*, locals officials on site eventually decided to build a wooden jetty. Described as remarkably effective at the time, the arrival of the naval shipworm soon underscored the vulnerability of this new landing spot. First detected in Lüderitzbucht, a space of increasing importance given the shift of the war southward, it also disrupted the landing process in Swakopmund. The next section then explores efforts to supply troops in the south. With few updates to Lüderitzbucht since the early days of German colonialism, war served as “a catalyst” for the expansion of railways.¹⁰ Natural forces, specifically mobile sand dunes, became a factor soon shaping this instrument of war. African bodies, exploited to build the railway in an effort to reach inland, now also completed the Sisyphean task of removing the sand from the tracks. The last section then traces African ingenuity, or German logistical problems, as colonial troops tried to reach Jakob Marengo and Simon Kooper. Whereas

both individuals operated in British-Cape Colony-German borderlands and have seen some scholarly attention,¹¹ they were also holding out thanks to their use of precolonial environmental infrastructure. The German colonial government relied on the help of the Cape Colony to kill Marengo, a storyline that has seen some scholarly interest thanks in part to a novel and TV mini-series.¹² Officials then employed camels to get a hold of Kooper. Colonial narratives framed both struggles in large part as a battle against nature, a dynamic that yet again underscores efforts to minimize the agency of Africans.

Drilling Wood

A couple of sentences uttered during a debate in German parliament warned the audience of the naval shipworm. As part of larger discussions surrounding the situation of the harbor in Swakopmund in March 1906, politicians reviewed disruptions and miscalculations that long haunted Germany's main entry point. Conversations outlined the challenges that had emerged when it came to silting-in as well as the described role of dredgers; they also already pointed to the construction of a wooden jetty and other potential investments. Government Building Officer August Wiskow, who had experience overseeing constructions in German East Africa,¹³ at one point elaborated on such issues in more detail. Along the way, and only in passing, he mentioned the shipworm and its potential role in Southwest Africa. Merely a couple of sentences overall, Wiskow outlined that the mollusk had been widespread along the West African coastline. Employing the passive voice, he then stated that "[i]n Togo back then the wooden landing pier, now replaced by a metal jetty, was destroyed within three months." Luckily, he added, there had been no shipworm in Swakopmund. Yet Wiskow warned his audience to be diligent, adding that "the danger for the wooden pier is not barred."¹⁴

At the time of Wiskow's comments, little had changed in Swakopmund. Although African labor had provided help unloading, military necessity still required a solution when it came to landing supplies. Speculations about the said commission's proposal tied to investments into the harbor would run wild for years. Even suggestions about larger investments, or the takeover of Walvis Bay from the British, pop up.¹⁵ On the ground, the construction of a wooden jetty had seemed like the best solution. On 10 September 1904, the military railway construction battalion had been dispatched to the colony.¹⁶ It arrived aboard the steamer *Ernst Woermann* in late October. Construction began quickly thereafter¹⁷—several months before the dredger would even show up. Although everything had to be brought in, assembly moved along quickly. The structure relied on sixty-six wooden beams, around thirty centimeters in diameter each, mostly out of pinewood. Iron rods provided additional sta-



Figure 6.1. 026-0401-48/ 041-0241-52, “Cargo train on the jetty in Swakopmund,” undated, courtesy of the Universitätsbibliothek J. C. Senckenberg, Frankfurt am Main.

bility. A steam engine drove beams two-and-a-half to four meters deep into the ocean floor. In some instances, the rocky ground required detonations.¹⁸ Such tasks, and the project overall, were dangerous, making the use of forced labor come in handy. Workers connecting different beams were exposed to cold ocean waters. Only a foreman warned them to hold on tight before seven to ten-degree centigrade waves crashed over them. As one report further described, “The continual work within the cold ocean wind, in soaked clothing, was no fun at all, but could not be avoided. There were also stark differences in climate [throughout any given day], with cold fog in the morning and evening, yet around noon the heat was often burning hot.”¹⁹ Not surprisingly, the workers’ state of health was generally terrible, with lots of sicknesses and several casualties due to typhoid.²⁰ The pier was scheduled to open on 1 February 1905; however, a shift in the war southward required a temporary movement of materials to Lüderitzbucht.²¹ The jetty finally opened 29 April 1905, just in time given widespread disruptions of the landing process at the *Mole* and the failures of dredgers (Figure 6.1).²²

The wooden pier, grounded in African exploitation though sold as a sign of German ingenuity in the face of adversity, brought praise from all around. It was 275 meters long, with approximately seventy-five on land. It held a rotary steam crane that was able to lift seven to ten tons as it unloaded ships.²³ Settler and writer Clara Brockmann, who had come to the colony intending to write a novel, voiced her relief: “Up to recent years,” she wrote, “passengers were carried on land by natives.” Africans thereby literally served as landing structures—“[t]wo black arms slinging around the new arrival, and a sturdy

negro waded away with them through the water.”²⁴ Captain of the German ship *Sperber*, Wilhelm Bertram, described the wooden jetty as “an excellent construction.”²⁵ The *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* newspaper agreed. That newspaper proclaimed in early 1906 already that it “had proven itself.”²⁶ Even those voices still debating and hoping for additional investments increasingly acknowledged its success. The jetty had indeed endured heavy weather, most notably in mid-1906. According to one vivid description, “The sight of the breakers was of overwhelming magnificence. Far out the sea was covered by a white foam. In-between long-winding waves are rolling in, always three-wave mountain chains close together, reared up with a thunder-like roar overturning on the beach, blinding-white foam climbing up like a wall and below, blotching up the beach and here leaving little puddles that at the same time are prevented from draining back into the sea.” The description continued noting that “The landing jetty at times completely disappeared in the rolling waves crashing over it, through the wooden panels white foam splashed up.” However, and in the colonial spirit of withstanding anything, “it again held steady.”²⁷ For the fiscal year 1906 alone, and just for Swakopmund, the expenditures were enormous: 130,000 Marks to keep the *Mole* running on some level, 200,000 Marks for dredgers, and 100,000 Marks for sustaining the wooden jetty.²⁸ Proposals now calling for a metal jetty referenced another 207,000 Marks and those wishing for a larger harbor budgeted an additional 1.4 million Marks.²⁹ Guaranteeing access to the colony would remain an expensive endeavor.

So-called *Bohrwurmtagebücher* disclose the agency of non-human protagonists soon interfering with wooden structures in Swakopmund and Lüderitzbucht. Best translated as shipworm diaries, these hand-written files are housed in the National Archives in Windhoek.³⁰ Mostly charts, the documents showcase ways authorities on site tried to understand what was happening after the arrival of the *Bohrwurm* (literally borer worm). How far has that antagonist drilled into wooden landing structures? What type of wood is more resistant? Would it be worthwhile to bring in turpentine-wood all the way from South America?³¹ One report outlined past mishaps, current issues and future investments; it also included carefully labeled photos of riddled pieces of wood (Figure 6.2). Such artifacts showcase the efforts of non-human agents: slick and naked worms; damaged pieces of wood. Without the voice of the shipworm in the historical record otherwise, these journals give this non-human protagonist some agency, illustrating in text and image how those worm-like creatures began disrupting German logistics.³²

The naval shipworm is not even a worm. Generally known as *Teredo navalis*, it is a highly specialized bivalve mollusk adjusted for drilling into and living in submerged wood. To follow writer Joan Wickersham’s poem from several years ago, “You, shipworm, *Teredo navalis*, less than a tenth of an inch / from end to end, blind and mindless, / relentlessly debauched or relentlessly



Figure 6.2. “Longitudinal cut through a beam of the main jetty destroyed by the shipworm,” NAN, ZBU 1762 T.VII.G I (vol 2), “Denkschrift über den Neubau der Hauptlandungsbrücke und die weitere Behandlung der Hafendra in Lüderitzbucht,” April 1908, courtesy of the National Archives Windhoek.

industrious—.”³³ Early descriptions saw its long and naked body to resemble worms.³⁴ Swedish botanist and zoologist Carl Linnaeus categorized over thirty species under “*teredo navalis*,” or naval shipworm.³⁵ To quote Wickersham again, “Your name shows up in every *Vasa* story, / both names: ‘Shipworm (*Teredo navalis*);’ / the Linnaean taxonomic like a graduate degree / trailing your name so that we will take you seriously.”³⁶ Warnings were warranted. Although a small protagonist, the naval shipworm, colloquially known as an ocean termite, has had a major impact on maritime history. “Plenty of other shipwrecks in other oceans, / seasoned just the way you like them,” Wickersham continues.³⁷ As a typical marine mollusk, it first lives like a tadpole in open waters. Once the size of a pinhead, it digs itself into wooden hulls, poles, and beams that are surrounded by water, leaving behind only tiny entry holes. As Wickersham writes, “Your life is tunnels. You borrow in, / eat your way home, eliminate, fornicate, / all in the same wet den. You’re a fraternity boy / who never leaves the house, / eating, drinking, shitting, releasing sperm.”³⁸ Difficult to detect, the shipworm employs its tiny sharp teeth to drill, or better, grate and rasp. Over time, it forms and expands a honeycomb of passages, while itself, a husk-like creature, stays glued to the actual entryway.³⁹ For wooden structures in Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund, *Teredo navalis* meant disaster.

The arrival of the shipworm brought numerous problems. It is not quite clear where it originated.⁴⁰ In the satirical magazine *Kladderdatsch* it already had a column in 1869. There, the mollusk pointed to man and his structures, built against bullets and opponents, strengthened with metal and might, and meant to dominate the ocean. “I have toppled him!” the column read, before adding, “What are you, man, you poor, weak earth worm against me—the shipworm!”⁴¹ Since then it had arrived in Lüderitzbucht, likely as a stowaway traveler. On site it found a perfect habitat. It seems that by mid-1906 the mollusk had created some damage. According to a memorandum submitted to parliament, the mollusk had settled in wooden rafts first before moving into landing structures. Early on the impact “had not been substantial.”⁴² Yet by November 1906 surveys of wooden parts of jetties showed clear shipworm infestation. Managing director of construction Kummer feared “that one must anticipate the destruction of the three wooden jetties.”⁴³ According to two scholars, “By mid-February 1907, the damage done by the borers was so substantial that considerable repair work had to [be] undertaken.”⁴⁴ The *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* newspapers certainly came to a similar conclusion by fall that year.⁴⁵ The Woermann-Line eventually stopped using the wooden jetties altogether. Similar to the situation in Swakopmund, landing now relied even more on surf boats and rafts. “Hopefully this unsustainable situation lasts only a little more time!” exclaimed one magazine.⁴⁶ Frustration set in. “One should have not thought possible,” noted one account, “that after the embarrassing experiences with the *Mole* in Swakopmund again a situation would emerge with landing facilities in the protectorate as those are now visible at the main landing structure in Lüderitzbucht. The naval shipworm in the jetty has expanded further and further. Just recently one of its beams simply broke off when a small lighter hit it and [that] exposed that the naval shipworm had eaten away at it. Without doubt, the bearing capacity of the jetty has been cut in half.”⁴⁷

Renovations brought little relief. Workers started replacing infested beams with impregnated wood; they also used iron sheets to protect the jetty from the mollusk.⁴⁸ Forced labor again came in handy, further weakening prisoners housed nearby on Shark Island, if not killing them. Prior to that the jetty had to shut down completely, at least until an expert could evaluate the damage and soundness of the structure.⁴⁹ Locals at the site had long monitored the situation. At one point, worries increased when reports outlined that a structure can only remain in operation for about three months after the shipworm had infested it.⁵⁰ Discussions had already begun with all kinds of proposals regarding possible replacements, including metal jetties and concrete structures. As Kummer noted in November 1906, “While with relative few expenditures could turn Lüderitzbucht and Robert Harbor from a nautical point of view in the best harbor of German Southwest Africa, two essential demands of any harbor are still completely lacking, [and] that is a good connection with the

producing and consuming backcountry as well as the supply with key resources from across the sea, namely useful fresh [drinking] water.⁵¹ Delays in funding would force supplies over increasingly decrepit wooden jetties for several more years while the Woermann-Line continually pushed for a replacement.⁵²

The situation in Lüderitzbucht gave officials in Swakopmund ample warning. To follow one early report, “When assessing its safety there are three elements to consider: silting, the ocean, and the naval shipworm.”⁵³ Many officials held on to the idea that cold currents might prevent the arrival of this mollusk. Such optimism turned out to be an illusion.⁵⁴ Yet even experts noted, “The use of wood to build the pier was considered unavoidable given the need for speedy construction, [and that] did not seem precarious either, because the naval shipworm had not been sighted in Swakopmund and the neighboring coastline.”⁵⁵ Soon observations tracked the progress of the infestation—still confident that little destruction had occurred so far.⁵⁶ Newspaper articles meanwhile described how the mollusk riddled poles and beams long-ways like a sieve.⁵⁷ “Those frenzied wooden Gomorrahs,” to quote Wickersham’s poem once more, “are really testaments to your efficiency—.”⁵⁸ At first, there seemed to be no imminent danger—but that changed quickly. According to one report, “If a swarm of naval shipworm larvae extensively attacks the pole woods, then the shipworm can develop in such a manner in the wood, that according to present—possibly pessimistic assumptions—within three months the wood fiber would be destroyed to such an extent, that the stability of the beams sinks to zero.”⁵⁹ A slightly less pessimistic account stated, “The beams of the pier are exposed to the attack of the naval shipworm. Although beams are mostly not protected, destruction has been limited. The highest number of worms found in a beam has been twelve. . . . During monthly tests, young animals are often found, a sign, that there is now a fresh attack.”⁶⁰ One German building officer now admitted to the role of the naval shipworm in the destruction of a similar project in the German colony of Togo in the recent past. In his view, other arrangements for sites in Swakopmund must be considered.⁶¹ Concerns spiraled, and reports soon spoke about a destructive force and the “danger of collapse.”⁶² The shipworm in Swakopmund, to quote one newspaper, had raised yet again the “harbor question.”⁶³

After monitoring the situation for some time officials on site decided to start replacing parts of the structure. Such work meant widening the pier by one-third, a process one colonial report described as a “vigorous interference” against this pest.⁶⁴ Ultimately completed in 1907, this update still left room to shut down sections of the jetty without disrupting operations.⁶⁵ Confident this would save the jetty, paid workers and forced laborers replaced riddled beams and poles with impregnated materials; they also protected some structures with sheet iron. Such work was a tedious and costly. Just arming one beam could require an astonishing 3,000 nails.⁶⁶ Similar to the construction

process, workers found themselves exposed to crashing waves and ice-cold waters.⁶⁷ In the end, their efforts were in vain. Whereas sheet iron and some imported Australian woods replaced infected materials to provide more stability, overall this achieved little when it came to the prevention of ongoing decay. “The danger,” to quote from one newspaper, “that an extraordinary rough sea could suddenly take away for Swakopmund and the whole central and northern part of the protectorate the most important organ for the acceptance of imports is growing steadily.”⁶⁸ Debates about the construction of a metal jetty, and once again calls for the purchase of Walvis Bay, made discussions predictable.⁶⁹ Meanwhile, colonial narratives characterized the wooden jetty built by the railway battalion as “an honorable monument to the diligence of those troops and its officers,”⁷⁰ a colonial narrative that once again silenced the roles of Africans.

Accessing the South

Another natural force to wrestle with is perhaps best exhibited by figures hauling sand across railway tracks in the middle of the Namib Desert. Crossing the high dunes right outside Lüderitzbucht had always been an issue, not just due to a lack of water. Barchans, linear dunes, and star dunes are visible in the Namib, and many of them are active.⁷¹ According to two scholars, “they have steep slopes (c 32°) on their lee sides and gentler slopes (2–10°) on their windward (stoss) sides, they have an ellipsoidal shape in plan-view, and have formed in response to the strong unidirectional (SSW) wind regimes that are prevalent in the coastal zone.”⁷² These mounds are mobile, able to bury much of anything in their way. Houses and homes could get covered. Travelers feared their movement and ability to change landscapes. People got lost because of them. With stretched supply lines, a shift of the war southward, and repeated border closures to the south by the Cape government, military necessity seemingly dictated the construction of a railroad right through them. The assembly in itself was already a daunting endeavor. Contracted workers and prisoners of war, the latter held in the infamous concentration camp Shark Island in Lüderitzbucht, provided the labor to make it happen. Yet problems with mobile dunes persisted, and manually transferring the yellowish substance—basically carrying sand across the tracks one shovel at a time—became the most workable solution.⁷³

Prior to thinking about travel inland authorities first had to worry about landing materials nearby. The war had swung south as Nama rose up. Yet border openings into South Africa remained unreliable.⁷⁴ Plus, supply lines in the north had been overstretched already.⁷⁵ Thus, more had to come through Lüderitzbucht. A backwater awaiting reawakening, that location still dealt with

a lack of drinking water. By December 1904 a drillmaster and his assistants arrived on site. They hoped to find fresh water nearby. Such efforts resulted in wells in Klein Kubub, Aus, and Gauamses, all locations at least thirty kilometers away from town.⁷⁶ By 1906 the Lüderitz Condenser had been replaced by a larger plant, the so-called Government Condenser.⁷⁷ However, even the representative for the company installing the machine soon acknowledged “that the new condensation machine . . . does not meet the guaranteed performance.”⁷⁸ Although the quality of the water itself was good, sand plugged it up repeatedly.⁷⁹ According to one government official, and future governor, Theodor Seitz, this was expensive for three reasons: water had to be shipped in from Cape Town, high wages of experts had to be paid, and the old condenser had to be overworked, which hurt that machine.⁸⁰ More problematic were the limitations of the harbor overall. The bay was still shallow in several places. And, to follow two scholars, “the existing jetty situated on the lagoon side off Lüderitzbucht was not of such quality that it could cope with the increasing amount of military goods which were handled there.”⁸¹ In early November 1904, a representative of the Woermann-Line had assessed the harbor. He noted that the jetty had been built in the wrong location. Soon landing operations shifted to the more protected neighboring Robert Harbor instead, a location without a jetty.⁸² As the town saw a wartime boom similar to that in Swakopmund better landing structures made sense.⁸³ The assembly of the eighty meters long and five meters wide wooden jetty began in November 1904. It was completed quickly.⁸⁴ With demand still on the rise, a second such structure, 125 meters long and eight meters wide, had been completed by October 1905.⁸⁵ At least the landing process had become a little easier.

Similar to the situation in Swakopmund, officials also widely relied on forced labor to compensate for existing limitations and expand operations. According to German missionary Laaf, efforts to occupy prisoners began with extensive blasting operations. “The aim was to construct a quay on the side of the island facing the Robertshafen. Almost 500 men were initially employed in the blasting operations.”⁸⁶ Moreover, and as outlined by historians, Nama prisoners had to construct a pier and a wave-breaker.⁸⁷ Both of these projects “involved standing in ice-cold water, picking up rocks, and dumping them in the sea,” as historian Casper W. Erichsen writes.⁸⁸ Plus, and just like in Swakopmund, prisoners served as pack animals and machines when loading, unloading and moving around all kinds of cargo. To follow one newspaper article from South Africa at the time, “The loads . . . are out of all proportion to their strength. I have often seen women and children dropping down [in Lüderitzbucht], especially when engaged on this work, and also when carrying very heavy bags of grain, weighing from 100 to 160lbs.”⁸⁹ Nama Anna Frederick shared the experiences of her great-grandparents who were imprisoned on Shark Island in an oral interview: “They carried soil and stones on their heads to fill this island

up. They died from hunger and cold.⁹⁰ Between August and November 1906, more than 2,000 Nama arrived on Shark Island, a camp located right next to the harbor.⁹¹ There, on a space that measured barely over a kilometer from end to end and about three hundred meters at the thickest point, surrounded by the ice-cold waters of the Atlantic Ocean, they tried to cling on to life.⁹² Samuel Isaak, imprisoned on Shark Island, remarked that to last the prisoners ate anything edible they could find—mussels and other sea life.⁹³ There was also not enough firewood to keep at least a little warm.⁹⁴ “It is difficult for me,” wrote camp prisoner Samuel Kariko. “My body is weak, and it is very cold. I do not know how I can stay here.”⁹⁵ Inmate Edward Fredericks, who survived to tell his story under oath in 1917, stated that “[l]ots of my people died on Shark Island.”⁹⁶ Diary entries and progress reports by Richard Müller, a German harbor engineer supervising projects in Lüderitzbucht, speak volumes about the conditions and the overall destruction of African lives.⁹⁷ According to a report from Christmas Eve 1906, workers died so quickly that authorities ran out of them. “If measures are not actively taken to acquire labourers,” as one official writes, “I fear the work will not be completed.”⁹⁸ With a mortality rate of 77.5 percent,⁹⁹ that camp soon became known as the “island of Death.”¹⁰⁰ “Notwithstanding the economic purposes of ruling the camps,” however, to follow Häussler, “guards went forward altogether uneconomically, yes even wasteful with the human labor force.”¹⁰¹ Or, as Zimmerer put it, “Not even the demand for labour led to better treatment for the prisoners. Rather was it seen as preferably [*sic*] to halt the building work.”¹⁰² The angel of death, as a German clerk wrote in passive voice, would visit the island many times.¹⁰³

Shark Island was a death camp and most knew that. According to missionary Vedder, “One account from Swakopmund in 1905 tells of a group of Herero assembled on the waterfront. Shortly after they had been informed that they were to be sent to Lüderitz, one prisoner fell to the ground, bleeding profusely, having drilled his fingers into his own neck in a desperate attempt to commit suicide.”¹⁰⁴ The officer was angry and ordered him to get up immediately—to no avail. The man had opened the veins in his neck and was bleeding to death. Erichsen references a similar example when noting that the Arthur Koppel Company, one main contractor that employed forced labor, explained to German officials that many prisoners had run away from the railway works “solely out of fear that they might be sent to the South.”¹⁰⁵ Whereas neglect at times has been cited to dismiss intent, efforts to deliberately kill off the local population are visible in the historical record. Governor von Lindequist was in no way shy about his objectives: “Since the Hottentots are at present safely confined to Shark Island where they are performing very useful work(?). I feel that their deportation may still be postponed somewhat. Perhaps one should wait and see first how the situation will develop and whether the numbers to be deported might be reduced so as to cut down the cost incurred.”¹⁰⁶ In

another instance described by missionary August Kuhlmann, overseer Benkesser shot a sick Herero woman five times and left her laying there. She bled to death.¹⁰⁷ In that sense, the intent was not only to provide cheap labor to conquer nature; such labor and overall conditions also became ways to kill the native population. Both death and development, intricately intertwined, were part of the colonial project.

Whereas for Germans such investments promised at least some relief when it came to landing, reaching beyond desert dunes was still a problem. The lack of a stable supply of water widely impacted efforts to cross the roughly eighty mile stretch of waterless desert with ox carts. In 1906, one commentator wrote about “[t]housands of bleached oxen skeletons covering the path, herald death and danger, step by step.”¹⁰⁸ A poem titled *Death in the Dunes* later illustrated the challenges when noting, “Lord, our days are numbered, God give us to drink!”¹⁰⁹ Ways to improve travel had long circulated within the colony. For some, a railway would do the trick.¹¹⁰ One commentator from Southwest Africa had captured the dangers of ever-shifting sands when writing, “These [wandering dunes] are blown together by the wind, often resounding mountains of fine sand, that today block access and force freight carriers to take detours with their heavy oxcarts through deep, loose sand, [while] tomorrow the following [wagon] trailing in their steps face a high unscalable wall.”¹¹¹ In his view crossing the dunes by train would not be an issue—the bigger concern was that few products required a train. Experts continued to argue, with some even proposing the construction of an elevated train scaling the dunes or a tunnel going right under them.¹¹² One military report put forward by the *S.M.S. Wolf* in November 1900 claimed that “[c]rossing the belt of wandering dunes with a railway will not be possible without major problems and costs and the completion of similar projects, as will be needed for Lüderitzbucht, where first the construction of a tunnel through twelve-kilometer wide dunes had been planned, that a project of an elevated train going over the dunes has recently been pursued.”¹¹³ Without demand, however, such proposals went nowhere.

The war changed calculations and resulted in the return of animal transfer, especially given the growing demand to supply troops inland. In early 1905, Lothar von Trotha sent a telegram to Berlin endorsing the import of a hundred camels from Tenerife and five hundred from neighboring South Africa—to help with logistics on the stretch Lüderitzbucht–Keetmanshoop.¹¹⁴ Yet camels were hard to come by, and it took some time to get them. The purchase of originally seventy-six camels at Port Said in Somalia, followed by another 403 later on (accompanied by sixty experienced Arab camel handlers) eventually increased the use of such animals in Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund.¹¹⁵ Next to animal transfers von Trotha also called for the construction of a railway. As summarized by Horst Drechsler, “This call went unheeded, however, because the authorities in Berlin were only too aware of the extraordinary technical difficulties posed by

such a project and because they reckoned that the war in the south would not last very long and might be over before the railway would make itself felt.”¹¹⁶ A more detailed proposal put forward in December 1905, combined with the continuation of the war in the south, got parliament to agree. The plan called for a line of about 140 kilometers from Lüderitzbucht to Aus. Tracks would be in Cape gauge (3.6 feet, about one meter) to possibly connect to neighboring South Africa later. The projected cost was estimated at around 9.5 million Marks, presumably about a quarter of the current annual cost for such travel.¹¹⁷

Natural forces and broader logistics shaped construction. The building process began quickly, led by military headman Captain Schulze.¹¹⁸ Apart from determining the route and overseeing the building process, Schulze laid out ways to cross the dunes. In his view, rocks would not give moving sand any grip, thus keeping tracks “dune free.” “At those locations where there is a danger for the railway to be covered by wandering dunes later on,” he added, “one has to roof [it] [the railway] like a tunnel with corrugated sheet iron. These protective structures and detonations within dunes will result in a good amount of labor that has to be taken into account especially since the rest of the way to Kubub requires virtually no other works of civil engineering.”¹¹⁹ Judging the situation in the colony from faraway Germany had always been an issue, a point that at least Johannes Semler, a member of parliament visiting German Southwest Africa, readily admitted when discussing harbor installations in Lüderitzbucht.¹²⁰ The magazine *Kladderdatsch* had long noted in its satirical tone that thankfully even a railway could do little to make things worse in Southwest Africa.¹²¹ In any case, the company Lenz organized the construction of what became known as the *Südbahn* (southern railway). As usual, landing materials in Lüderitzbucht was tricky, especially larger machinery. Plus, drinking water was still expensive. Crossing hostile landscapes and dealing with heat was not easy either and further delayed the project. As one newspaper later summarized, “Due to the terrain and weather the construction of bridges brought problems and held back the quick progress of the building process.”¹²² Camels also played a role—the German government by then had imported an astonishing 2,000 animals. Their initial purpose was to help transport materials for the construction of the *Südbahn*.¹²³ “Provisions of those [workers] more or less united at the front end of the construction site was particularly difficult,” noted one observer, “especially when it came to water. The transport of all materials and foods was done originally by donkey cart and via camel, soon with track maintenance trains.”¹²⁴ Photographs portraying structures in Lüderitzbucht and desolate landscapes in the interior showcase the scale of the project. In a way, the pace of construction tells that story. Early on, and due to the Namib Desert, crews only covered between three hundred and four hundred meters a day; later that process sped up to almost nine hundred meters. Construction reached Aus on 10 October 1906, allowing the railway to open on 1 November

1906.¹²⁵ By then Schulze's colonial narrative of fighting against desert sands, heat, and aridity already referenced German character and ingenuity, just like Ortloff had done when describing the construction of the *Mole*.

Forced laborers actually built the *Südbahn*. As outlined in the *Deutsche Bauzeitung* newspaper, "Excavation employed several hundred European workers and Kapboys [derogatory term for workers from the Cape Colony] as well as around 1,000 forced laborers"—the men of the railway brigade only completed work tied to the superstructure.¹²⁶ Member of parliament Semler, who visited the construction site, described Herero workers hauling iron ties while the hands of white workers did the fitting—a smooth process, in his view.¹²⁷ By January 1908, and according to recent scholarship, 503 whites and 1,859 blacks worked on the construction of the railway.¹²⁸ One of the few photographs capturing the work along the *Südbahn* gives viewers an idea of the strenuous task: desert sands, high temperatures, blazing sun, backbreaking labor.¹²⁹ The route from the coast to Aus called for hundreds of workers laying heavy steel rails and prefabricated steel ties. British military attaché to Southwest Africa, Frederick Trench, reported in April 1907 that there were nine hundred prisoners of war working there. He added, "The Hottentots are poor labourers, though troublesome guerrilla warriors, and I think that there is a general hope that they will soon die out."¹³⁰ Trench had already described the situation in a concentration camp stating "It is not easy to avoid the impression that the extinction of the tribe would be welcomed by authorities."¹³¹ The local newspaper *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung* at one point mentions that concentration camp labor from the nearby camp Shark Island built the southern line, one of only a couple of references in the press.¹³² According to historians, "it was the construction of the railways, by far the biggest public-works project attempted in the colony, that became the engine driving the whole concentration camp system."¹³³ Private companies such as the Woermann-Line thus employed forced laborers in Swakopmund and Lüderitzbucht to compensate for the shortcomings of landing structures; other companies now relied on such labor for the construction of railways. The idea that corporations running their own camps would take care of their workers did not pan out whatsoever.¹³⁴ The private sector as much as the colonial government worked Herero and Nama to death and ultimately profited greatly from these forced labor archipelagos. Overall, and as one summary pointed out later, "The statistics of the railway project are frightening. According to numbers kept in the records of the German Colonial Administration, a total of 2,014 concentration camp prisoners were used for the railway construction between January 1906 and June 1907. From these prisoners 1,359 died while working on the line: a 67 percent mortality rate. This means that every hundred metres of the railway line from Lüderitz to Aus account for one dead Namibian Shark Island prisoner."¹³⁵ The southern railway sits on the bodies and bones of Africans.

Reaching Beyond

Jakob Marengo's revival of a "hidden retreat"¹³⁶ delayed German efforts to end the war. As the conflict had expanded deeper into the south, Marengo, the son of a Herero mother and a Nama father, hid in spaces Germans knew little about. Borderlands became useful in this context, a factor widely discussed in the scholarship.¹³⁷ Yet Marengo also relied on precolonial environmental infrastructure when disappearing into the Karras Mountains. According to scholar Klaus Dierks, a structure known as "||Khauxa!nas certainly appears, with its extensive protective walls, to have served a defensive purpose. The town within the protective walls was big enough to accommodate a large number of people and probably livestock as well."¹³⁸ Plus, a deep natural well provided water.¹³⁹ Dierks argues that the site was potentially built between 1796 and 1798 "as a secret refuge against the threat from the south."¹⁴⁰ In his view, Jonker Afrikaner's foundation of Windhoek in the early 1840s "could be seen as a successor to ||Khauxa!nas."¹⁴¹ For Marengo the space was perfect. Here, he could hide from colonial troops. A German report speaks about a discussion with Marengo in one of his hideouts that references stone fortifications.¹⁴² Whereas this turned ||Khauxa!nas "a fitting symbol of Namibian resistance,"¹⁴³ for the German military the existence of such remote spaces made a quick end to the war more and more unlikely.

It did not help that efforts to expand the railway southward all the way to Keetmanshoop had resulted in a political crisis in Germany. Calls for such an extension had increased given the continuation of the war in the south; there was also the potential for using such structures to settle the area after the war. In May 1906, an article on the front page of the *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung* newspaper argued in favor of expanding railways from the south all the way to Windhoek. "Such a train connection," to quote directly, "would just like that . . . assist in the settlement of the land much more than any other measures ever could."¹⁴⁴ That year a memorandum made similar claims.¹⁴⁵ Even General Helmuth von Moltke the Younger chimed in from far away Berlin in support of the route.¹⁴⁶ Yet criticism of colonial endeavors had long been apparent in some political circles. Center Party politician Matthias Erzberger most directly pointed to financial strains and colonial fiascos in 1906.¹⁴⁷ It took until the dissolution of parliament in the infamous "1907 Hottentotten elections" before funds poured in. At that point, assembly moved forward. The route to Keetmanshoop included the construction of a dam to deal with washouts in the Sandverhaar River; it also meant crossing the Fish River with a steel bridge consisting of three thirty-five-meter spans.¹⁴⁸ Plus, there were the usual issues with accessing water. Geologists Paul Range and his drilling crew thankfully worked along that route. At least one borehole provided sufficient water near Garub, which somewhat alleviated potential delays.¹⁴⁹ Again, forced labor



Figure 6.3. NAN 28671, “Construction of the railway line Lüderitzbucht-Keetmanshoop, 1906. Female workers (probably prisoners of war) carrying stones for railway dam on their heads,” courtesy of the National Archives Windhoek.

completed much of the work. One of the few photographs showcases “female workers (probably prisoners of war) carrying stones for railway embankments on their heads” in 1906 (Figure 6.3).¹⁵⁰ The extension from Aus all the way to Keetmanshoop opened 21 June 1908, much sooner than had been anticipated; it cost 27.6 million Marks.¹⁵¹

Shifting sands covering tracks remained a problem well beyond the official opening of the *Südbahn*. Complications emerged in a section of about six to seven kilometers right outside of Lüderitzbucht.¹⁵² A member of parliament visiting the site early on saw few issues; he also reported that a concrete covering meant to protect the tracks was not required. Instead, and in his view, there were cheaper options to solve the problem.¹⁵³ Early efforts had included embankments meant to elevate the tracks; piles of rocks stacked to protect track against shifting dunes were another way to keep sand out.¹⁵⁴ A detailed newspaper article with photos described the situation in 1908. One caption simply read, “A wandering dune in dangerous proximity to the railway.”¹⁵⁵ Over time more sophisticated responses included the use of indigenous sand grass (*Eragrostis*) and German grass types; there was also the fixation of dung.¹⁵⁶ Workers tried using mats made out of jute sacking and placed them on one side of the tracks hoping to hold down the sand, all to provide stability for the growth of

different vegetation.¹⁵⁷ Mostly completed during months with less wind (May until October), sand grass seemed to be the only useful plant. However, shrubs withered away without water, “never awoke to life and just lingered as a dead arrangement,” as one magazine noted.¹⁵⁸ Experimental stations in the middle of desert landscapes were supposed to help with the transfer and cultivation of plants that could presumably withstand heat and fix sand in place.¹⁵⁹ Experiments with acacias (*Acacia cyclops*) and Naras (*Acanthosicyos horrida*) showed the best results.¹⁶⁰ Whereas managing director Kummer remained confident,¹⁶¹ British colonel and military attaché Trench was less so. In his view, “to shovel the sand off the line about twice a week” was the only workable solution.¹⁶² Yet hopes to solve this problem continued for years to come.¹⁶³ In fact, at one point plans even involved grasses used to fix shifting dunes along the faraway Trans-Siberian Railway.¹⁶⁴ Throughout all that time, and as captured by a grisly photograph published in the magazine *Kolonie und Heimat*, forced laborers did the Sisyphean task of moving sand with shovels across the tracks, one scoop at a time.¹⁶⁵

Colonial narratives meanwhile painted a rosy picture of development and progress. “Now it is done,” proclaimed the magazine *Kolonie und Heimat* in 1908, “despite natural forces that had destroyed the site at the end of February [1907] in numerous locations and other technical difficulties.”¹⁶⁶ The magazine had described the fight against desert sands. It now concluded its plot with a happy ending. There had been numerous of those by then. Ortloff had defeated ocean waters when constructing the *Mole*. Engineers had scaled hostile landscapes when building the *Staatsbahn*. And “our heroes in German Southwest Africa” constructed two jetties as well as a condenser for making drinking water in Lüderitzbucht.¹⁶⁷ Now, and according to this narrative, Germans also had defeated mobile sand dunes. Two photographs from 1909 give a sense of this supposed battle against the desert. One photo titled “dune protection wall” shows the wooden planks supposed to hold back sand (Figure 6.4); another snapshot titled “Inspection of railway tracks threatened by sand dunes” captures German officials wandering along the desert line surrounded by sand (Figure 6.5). Officials seem to inspect the frontline like military generals observing a trench of some battle. For contemporaries it certainly felt like a war, a war meant to hold back the enemy again and again. In 1911, one estimate noted that 100,000 Marks were “thrown away” to irrigate plants meant to hold back sand; that year operations to keep the track clear cost the government more than 170,000 Marks.¹⁶⁸ Some officials would later even consider expanding efforts when proposing the use of a giant vacuum, a *Sandsauge-Maschine* (sand sucking machine). This piece of technology would certainly solve remaining problems, they claimed.¹⁶⁹ According to such rhetoric, it had always been German ingenuity, willpower, and hard work that had conquered and defeated nature. Natural forces, on the other hand, were at best adversaries,



Figure 6.4. NAN 28723, “Construction of the railway line Lüderitzbucht-Keetmanshoop. Dune protection wall: Lifting the wall planks, 1909,” courtesy of the National Archives Windhoek.

and African workers, ninety to a hundred forced laborers in the case of dune operations along the *Südbahn* alone,¹⁷⁰ had no voice at all.

Elsewhere African ingenuity, as well as natural forces, continued to define logistics. Take Simon Kopper’s escape into the Kalahari Desert. A borderland between Southwest Africa, the Cape Colony, and British Bechuanaland,¹⁷¹ Kopper employed San knowledge to find water. More importantly, and given long stretches without any available drinking water, Kopper and his people relied on the seasonal *Tsamma* melon (*Citrullus lanatus*). Its wide availability in some areas, combined with its high liquid content, could sustain whole groups with their cattle.¹⁷² As Jan N̄arewe Kundeb, born in Otjomungwindi in 1920 to !Xoon and Naro ancestors, recalled, “When the water in the pan was finished, we got water from tsamma melons and wild cucumbers. They were our water.”¹⁷³ Careful animal adaptation allowing ungulates to digest the fruit was required and speaks volumes about the skills of those Africans covering larger distances in desert environments on horseback. Kopper and his men could thus use seemingly remote desert spaces as bases for raids into the colony; they could also escape across the border into neighboring British Bechuanaland or the Cape Colony. German colonial troops, on the other hand, had to work with camels yet again. In March 1907, a small group under the leadership of Major Pierer reached Kopper. The latter agreed to give up. However, once pressed for water the patrol had to go ahead and return quickly, which once again gave Kopper the opportunity to escape.¹⁷⁴ A vast operation then took shape. Spearheaded by Friedrich von Erckert, months went into preparations. Cam-



Figure 6.5. NAN 28724, “Construction of the railway line Lüderitzbucht-Keetmanshoop. Inspection of railway tracks threatened by sand dunes, 1909,” courtesy of the National Archives Windhoek.

els mostly employed for transport from Lüderitzbucht inland, and originally imported by Hagenbeck, were now to serve von Erckert. The latter then oversaw the training of both animals and soldiers. “Mainly introducing them to the nature of the Kalahari and how to defeat its peculiar difficulties” was on the agenda, according to von Erckert’s superior, Ludwig von Estroff.¹⁷⁵ Few soldiers had any experiences with camels. Many times that resulted in the mistreatment of these animals. Descriptions of stubborn beasts thus likely speak much more to German impatience rather than actual animal behavior. Yet such obstinacy also underscores how animal agents shaped environmental infrastructure. For Germans, after all, these creatures were just tools employed to deal with an opponent. Early on most camels refused to get up or move once overloaded. At times they also screamed persistently until they got a more patient handler or less cargo. Since few of these pack animals were meant for riding, the Germans also had to spend weeks on increasing their pace.¹⁷⁶ It ultimately took months before German animal engineering had the caravan ready, by then consisting of more than seven hundred camels. Aforementioned colonial narratives described the exhausting journey defined by thirst and uncertainty; those tales also credit von Erckert for using camels, praise him for thinking ahead when it came to travel routes, and turned him into a martyr. Kooper, on the other hand, is characterized as a lazy coward given that he would not face Germans in open battle.¹⁷⁷ That the Franzman had created elaborate infrastructure in desert environments, and protected and sustained themselves against German extermination for months, did not seem to matter.

The war by then had already ended. Officially concluded in March 1907, fights against individuals such as Marengo and Kooper continued to frustrate officials. At the same time, those conflicts also allowed German colonialists to request more troops and resources for years to come. In September 1907 the Cape Mounted Police patrolling across the border from Southwest Africa then riddled Marengo with bullets. They had cooperated with the Germans. Marengo and several of his companions died on the spot.¹⁷⁸ Efforts to capture Kooper failed. The captain preferred to stay in an inhospitable environment rather than surrender. Thanks to such spaces, and combined with the British acknowledgment that it is more efficient to pay off opponents than invest into large military operations, the Germans dejectedly granted Kooper a pension.¹⁷⁹ The captain of the *Franzman* and the rest of his people thus settled in British Bechuanaland, displaced by war and genocide, and only after promising not to return to Southwest Africa.

The expansion of the war and the shift southward increased logistical issues for the German military. Lüderitzbucht had seen few investments. That made landing supplies a nightmare, especially once the shipworm further disrupted landing. Efforts to build a train across the Namib Desert brought additional challenges, overcome in large part on the backs of African forced labor. The import of camels, again meant to offer sustainable travel into arid landscapes, became essential for reaching Kooper.¹⁸⁰ Meanwhile mobile sand dunes continued to disrupt entry. Broader political disagreements resulted in the repeated closures of the border to South Africa, another way to get in supplies. African leaders, on the other hand, continued to resist German control by harassing patrols in arid landscapes—only to quickly disappear into inaccessible regions such as the Karras Mountains or the Kalahari Desert. Border crossings into the Cape Colony or British Bechuanaland gave such insurgents room to evade German capture and destruction. Such partisan warfare and guerilla tactics worried the Germans and postponed the end of the war.¹⁸¹ And that in turn further delayed efforts to finally begin transforming Southwest Africa into a white settler colony.

Colonial storylines, many times devoid of African agency, meanwhile spoke of a struggle against nature. Narratives saw the mollusk as much as an opponent as mobile desert dunes and aridity. Defeat and setbacks were at best temporary, as German ingenuity, determination, and hard work would certainly overcome any adversary. If anyone, according to that storyline, it would be the Germans who could conquer nature in Southwest Africa. That African labor began replacing the wooden jetty, kept harbor operations running, and built as well as maintained the railway was not of interest. Nature was the opponent of

German greatness, a backdrop to be taken over and reshaped. Africans as individuals, on the other hand, were barely mentioned. As demonstrated by historian Gesine Krüger, colonial diaries speak to Germans denying the strength of their opponents, their fears of thirst, hunger, disease, and ambush; those publications also capture underlying racism.¹⁸² According to German colonial narratives Africans had no abilities in traditional warfare. They were cowards for shying away from open battle and cunning for making use of the territory. At the same time, German soldiers had some self-doubt, frustrations, and irritations, and their anxieties grew over time as opponents seamlessly melted into desert wastelands. One soldier described an incident near Otjasusu when noting, “If one could only see one of those black beasts! One is fighting against invisible ghosts of hell . . .”¹⁸³ Again, Germans compared them to animals and beasts, called their opponents malicious, like hyenas, to follow the description of settler Conradt Rust.¹⁸⁴ In that context and mindset, and as emphasized in the scholarship more recently, indiscriminately murdering Africans seemed only logical.¹⁸⁵

As the end of the conflict came near colonial narratives also increasingly framed the war as a turning point. By 1907/8, a colony presumably slumbering like sleeping beauty could be awakened for good. As outlined in much of the scholarship, dispossession, expulsion, and extermination became prerequisites for the making of a German settler colony and society in Namibia. Equally, and as Miescher writes, “the development of such a settler society was influenced by the massive influx of funds for infrastructure and administration that poured into the colony after 1904.”¹⁸⁶ To contemporaries, development was always just around the corner.¹⁸⁷ In 1905, colonial proponent August Seidel already laid out his vision of the colony’s future. In his view, investments in Swakopmund, the solution of the water question, and the expansion of settlements would be essential; he also wanted the remaining Herero to become workers and called for the takeover of the Ovambo in the north.¹⁸⁸ Such sentiments and hopes for the future were widespread. After all, the empire had just spent around 585 million Marks to crush the rebellion.¹⁸⁹ The 1907 elections marked a particular shift away from a previously schizophrenic colonial policy as more money began pouring in.¹⁹⁰ More so, and as outlined in numerous accounts, “all that German blood that drenched the sand steppes of Southwest Africa, better not [have] been spilled in vain.”¹⁹¹ Such bloodshed must have had a purpose, it must have been for something. According to one colonial administrator, “the blood of their sons has been spilled for us. The Southwest African soil has been soaked with it. And since the lifeblood of so many children of German mothers has trickled into the sand the land has truly become German.”¹⁹² The war became yet another foundational myth,¹⁹³ a “rise like a Phoenix from the ashes.”¹⁹⁴ The money spent and the lives lost now meant Germany had a responsibility to the land, to follow the rhetoric of

one contemporary.¹⁹⁵ How could anyone argue with that? By 1905, Ferdinand Wohltmann, agriculturalist and colonial proponent, had already called on Germany's honor: "A soil, that cost us much concern and sweat, that is soaked with blood, that has become to so many Germans, even if an unhappy, then certainly a lovely Heimat homeland, such a soil has become a piece [of the] *Vaterland* (fatherland). . . . To give up and leave such a piece of land now would be treason against the *Vaterland*."¹⁹⁶ In Southwest Africa, blood and soil, terms deeply ingrained in discussions of settler colonialism, war, and genocide, went hand in hand. A 1908 publication further summarized such sentiments when stating, "Again and again, well-meaning men raise the question if Southwest Africa was worth these sacrifices of resources and blood. Well, apart from the Namib Desert we can respond with an exultant yes. What the Cape land with its half a million whites is worth for the English that is what our South West Africa will be worth for us sometime, once we extract the values from the soil, which are in there."¹⁹⁷ The author continued by pointing to existing cattle farming, copper mining, and the exploitation of guano deposits; he also laid out a future of agriculture and raw materials such as gold and diamonds.¹⁹⁸ The settlement of farmers, the construction of railways, and the digging of wells would make up the future of Southwest Africa.¹⁹⁹

Going hand in hand with development came the destruction of Herero, Nama, and other groups. That had meanwhile reached its climax. German troops killed many in war; they also pushed survivors into the desert where many died of thirst and exhaustion. Policies of extermination continued well beyond the departure of von Trotha and the shift of the war elsewhere. In need of labor to maintain, repair, and expand landing structures and railways, or just to replace draft animals, the German colonial government soon housed workers in concentration camps all over the colony. Gewalt notes that there were four collection and concentration camps in central Namibia: Swakopmund, Windhoek, Otjihaenena, and Omburo.²⁰⁰ The emergence of what sociologist Steinmetz has called a "spatially discontinuous, pointillistic galaxy of *werfts* . . . scattered across the map largely according to colonizers' needs" illustrates the expansive nature of this system well beyond these main sites.²⁰¹ Railway construction "saw several thousands of Herero 'accommodated' in 'Railway Concentration Labour Camps,'" to follow one report.²⁰² As outlined by Erichsen, "the main reasons for sending prisoners to Lüderitz was to prevent their escape and to provide labour for the construction of local infrastructure."²⁰³ Extermination based on labor became the name of the game, a costly game that few African captives survived. Those who did had lost their land, spaces soon deemed *herrenlos* (abandoned) in German documentation.²⁰⁴ They were now permanently trapped in a subservient role as a black proletariat. Governor von Lindequist already outlined in 1906 that he wanted to end the self-sufficiency of all indigenous groups that had been part of the rebellion;²⁰⁵ that now also

increasingly applied to groups outside direct colonial control, such as “a large number of Hai||om” from the north.²⁰⁶ In that sense, forced labor of a different kind would continue to define the postwar period, a timeframe recently described as much more than a peaceful graveyard.²⁰⁷

Notes

1. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Eine Anerkennung,” 25 March 1908; *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, “Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Vorstoß gegen Simon Copper,” 1 April 1908.
2. *Windhuker Nachrichten*, “Nachruf!” 21 March 1908; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Nachruf,” 25 March 1908; *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, “Nachrufe,” 1 May 1908. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Hauptmann v. Erckert †,” 25 March 1908.
3. Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung I des Großen Generalstabes, eds., *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika, Sechstes Heft, Der Hottentotenkrieg*, 361–82. See also Wulf D. Haacke, “The Kalahari Expedition, March 1908: The Forgotten Story of the Final Battle of the Nama War,” *Botswana Notes and Records* 24 (1992): 1–18; Andreas Bühler, *Der Namaaufstand gegen die deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Namibia von 1904–1913* (Frankfurt am Main, 2003), 322–23.
4. *Windhuker Nachrichten*, “Ein grosser, aber teuer erkaufter Sieg,” 21 March 1908. See also *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Ein schwerer Schlag aber ein Erfolg in Südwestafrika,” 28 March 1908; *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, “Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Vorstoß gegen Simon Copper,” 1 April 1908;
5. Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung I des Großen Generalstabes, eds., *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika, Sechstes Heft*, 376.
6. Hans Grimm, *Der Zug des Hauptmanns von Erckert* (Munich, 1932). See also Adolf Fischer, *Südwestener Offiziere* (Berlin, 1935); Hans Schmiedel, *Hauptmann Friedrich von Erckert in Deutschsuedwestafrika und seine Zeit* (Ansbach, 1974); Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe*.
7. Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 174.
8. Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser’s Holocaust*, 180.
9. Wulf Otte, *Weiß und Schwarz—Black and White: Photos aus Deutsch-Südwestafrika/ from Namibia 1896–1901* (Wendeburg, 2007), 43.
10. Laak, *Imperiale Infrastruktur*, 127.
11. Tilman Dederling, “War and Mobility in the Borderlands of South Western Africa in the Early Twentieth Century,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 39, no. 2 (2006): 275–94; Mads Bomholt Nielsen, “Colonial Resistance and Anglo-German Diplomacy: The Case of Jakob Marengo,” in *Resistance and Colonialism: Insurgent Peoples in World History*, ed. Nuno Dimingos, Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, and Ricardo Roque, 273–94 (New York, 2019); Lindner, *Koloniale Begegnungen*. See also Martin Legassick, *Hidden Histories of Gordonia: Land Dispossession and Resistance in the Northern Cape, 1800–1990* (Johannesburg, 2016).
12. Timm, *Morenga*; Egon Günther, dir., *Morenga* (Cologne, 1983). See also John Masson, “A Fragment of Colonial History: The Killing of Jakob Marengo,” *Journal of Southern*

- African Studies* 21, no. 2 (1995): 247–56; John Masson, *Jakob Marengo: An Early Resistance Hero of Namibia* (Windhoek, 2001).
13. Ariane Komeda, *Kolonialarchitektur: Kolonialarchitektur in Namibia zwischen Norm und Übersetzung* (Göttingen, 2020), 156.
 14. Reichstag, 74. Sitzung, 24 March 1906. Retrieved 12 March 2021 at www.reichstagprotokolle.de.
 15. *Windhuker Nachrichten*, “Swakopmunder Hafenbau,” 21 February 1907. See also *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Bemerkungen zu den Verkehrsverhältnissen in Deutsch-Südwestafrika,” 22 July 1905; *Windhuker Nachrichten*, “Die Hafen-Anlagen in Swakopmund,” 12 December 1907; Arthur Dix, “Landungsverhältnisse in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika,” *Kolonie und Heimat*, 8 December 1907. Some hoped to dupe the British into giving up Walvis Bay. See BArch, R 1001/ 1865a, “Hafenanlagen in Swakopmund” (Antrag Untersuchung Hafenverhältnisse). See also *Windhuker Nachrichten*, “Swakopmund und nicht Walfischbai!” 21 February 1907.
 16. *Windhuker Nachrichten*, “Die Eisenbahntruppe in Südwestafrika,” 6 December 1906. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Die Eisenbahntruppe in Südwestafrika,” 26 September 1906.
 17. Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 99. See also *Windhuker Nachrichten*, “Die Eisenbahntruppe in Südwestafrika,” 6 December 1906.
 18. Hafentechnische Gesellschaft, *Die Deutsche Kolonialhäfen*, 65. Efforts to find wood based on afforestation had brought few results See Antti Erkkilä and Harri Siiskonen, *Forestry in Namibia, 1850–1990* (Joensuu, Finland, 1992).
 19. Lengeling, “Die neue Landungsbrücke in Swakopmund,” *Zentrale Bauverwaltung*, 28 October 1905, 545–46 and 546–47.
 20. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus Swakopmund,” 31 May 1905. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus Swakopmund,” 17 May 1905.
 21. Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 99.
 22. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus Swakopmund,” 31 May 1905. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus Swakopmund,” 17 May 1905; *Windhuker Nachrichten*, “Die Eisenbahntruppe in Südwestafrika,” 6 December 1906.
 23. Lengeling, “Die neue Landungsbrücke in Swakopmund,” *Zentrale Bauverwaltung*, 28 October 1905, 546.
 24. Clara Brockmann, *Briefe eines deutschen Mädchens aus Südwest* (Berlin, 1912), 11. See also Africanus, *Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika*, 9; Emil Eisinger, *Im Damarland und Kaokofeld*, 5.
 25. BArch-B, R 1001/ 1864, Häfen an der südwestafrikanischen Küste (Militärpolitischer Bericht, 24 April 1906).
 26. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Südwestafrika: Die Swakopmunder Landungsverhältnisse,” 7 April 1906. See also Berthold von Deimling, *Südwestafrika: Land und Leute, unsere Kämpfe Wert der Kolonie: Vortrag gehalten in einer Anzahl deutscher Städte* (Berlin, 1906), 5.
 27. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus dem Schutzgebiet: Unwetter,” 13 June 1906.
 28. NAN, HBS, St. Unit 5, File 2/4, Kaiserlicher Gouverneur 24 May 1906.
 29. *Ibid.*, Bericht, Hafenfrage Swakopmund, 1907.
 30. For diaries from 1911 until 1913, see NAN, HBS, St. Unit 11, File 4/3; NAN, HBS, St. Unit 12, File 4/3.

31. NAN, ZBU, 1767 T.VII.G.5 Hafen von Lüderitzbucht Bau und Unterhaltung der Landungsbrücke. Specialia (1906–10), Reichskolonialamt Erlass, 7 July 1907. See also NAN, ZBU, 1767 T.VII.G.5 Hafen von Lüderitzbucht Bau und Unterhaltung der Landungsbrücke. Specialia (1906–10), Kaiserliches Hafenamtsamt, letter, 22 June 1907. Thirty-three wooden poles arriving from South America in January 1908 speak to broader efforts. See NAN, ZBU, 1767 T.VII.G.5 Hafen von Lüderitzbucht Bau und Unterhaltung der Landungsbrücke. Specialia (1906–10), Kaiserliches Hafenamtsamt, letter, 25 April 1908.
32. NAN, ZBU, 1884–1915, 1762 T.VII.G I (Vol 2) Hafen von Lüderitzbucht. Allgemeines (Projekte- und Vorarbeiten) (1908–11), Denkschrift über den Neubau der Hauptlandungsbrücke und die weitere Behandlung der Hafenanfrage in Lüderitzbucht, April 1908.
33. Joan Wickersham, “Shipworm (*Teredo Navalis*),” *Agni* 82 (2015): 126–127, here 127.
34. University of Michigan (Museum of Zoology). Retrieved 20 July 2017 from http://animaldiversity.org/accounts/Teredo_navalis/. See also Michael Castagna, *Shipworms and Other Marine Borers* (Washington, DC, 1961).
35. Ernst Troschel, ed., *Handbuch der Holzkonservierung* (Berlin, 1916), 208.
36. Wickersham, “Shipworm (*Teredo Navalis*),” 126.
37. *Ibid.*, 127.
38. *Ibid.*, 126.
39. Troschel, *Handbuch der Holzkonservierung*, 209–12. Troschel remarked that the naval shipworm was “particularly ravaging (*gefrässig*) and feared” in Southwest Africa.
40. Most scholars believe it originated in Europe. See Heike Lippert et al., “Schiffsbohrmuscheln auf dem Vormarsch? Holzzerstörer in der Ostsee,” *Biologie in unserer Zeit* 43, no. 1 (2013): 46–53. Retrieved 10 April 2017 from http://www.sms.si.edu/irlspec/teredo_navalis.htm; Viktoras Didžiulis (2011), NOBANIS, Invasive Alien Species Fact Sheet, *teredo navalis*. Online Database of the European Network on Invasive Alien Species (NOBANIS). Retrieved 10 April 2017 from www.nobanis.org.
41. *Kladderdatsch*, *humoristisch-satirisches Wochenblatt*, “Feuilleton,” 23 May 1869.
42. Aktenstück zu Nr. 622, Entwicklung der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee. Retrieved 12 March 2021 from [accessible at www.reichstagsprotokolle.de](http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de).
43. NAN, ZBU, 1884–1915 (Vol. 1), 1762, T.VII.G I, Hafen Lüderitzbucht, Allgemeines (Projekte- und Vorarbeiten) (1906–1908), letter 27 November 1906.
44. Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 110.
45. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Aus unseren Kolonien. Südwestafrika: Der Bohrwurm in der Landungsbrücken von Lüderitzbucht,” 19 October 1907. See also *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Aus unseren Kolonien: Südwestafrika: Landungsverhältnisse in Lüderitzbucht,” 7 November 1907.
46. *Kolonie und Heimat*, “Südwestafrika,” 24 November 1907.
47. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Unsere Landungsanlagen,” 18 September 1907.
48. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Aus unseren Kolonien: Aus Lüderitzbucht,” 18 July 1908.
49. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Unsere Landungsanlagen,” 16 October 1907.
50. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Der Lüderitzbuchter Zwischenfall,” 19 October 1907.
51. NAN, ZBU, 1884–1915 (Vol. 1), 1762, T.VII.G I, Hafen Lüderitzbucht, Allgemeines (Projekte- und Vorarbeiten) (1906–1908), letter 27 November 1906. See also Colonial Secretary Bernhard Dernburg in this context. NAN, ZBU, 1884–1915 (Vol. 1), 1762,

- T.VII.G I, Hafen Lüderitzbucht, Allgemeines (Projekte- und Vorarbeiten) (1906–1908), letter 11 December 1906. See also NAN, ZBU, 1884–1915 (Vol. 1), 1762, T.VII.G I, Hafen Lüderitzbucht, Allgemeines (Projekte- und Vorarbeiten) (1906–1908), for instance, letter 10 November 1906; letter 27 November 1906; proposal April 1907.
52. *Die Woermann-Linie während des Aufstandes in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika*, 39.
 53. Oscar Bongard, “Dernburgs Studienreise nach Britisch- und Deutsch-Südwestafrika!” *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, Sonderbeilage zur Nr. 39, 26 September 1908, 700.
 54. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus Swakopmund,” 18 July 1906.
 55. Lengeling, “Die neue Landungsbrücke in Swakopmund,” *Zentrale Bauverwaltung*, 28 October 1905, 545. See also Semler, *Meine Beobachtungen in Süd-West-Afrika*, 54–55.
 56. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus Swakopmund,” 18 July 1906.
 57. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Dernburgs Studienreise durch Britisch- und Deutsch Südwestafrika!” 12 September 1908.
 58. Wickersham, “Shipworm (*Teredo Navalis*),” 126.
 59. BArch-B, R 1001/ 1865a, Hafenanlagen in Swakopmund (Antrag Untersuchung Hafenverhältnisse).
 60. *Ibid.*, (Bauprogramm für den Bau einer Landungsbrücke in Swakopmund).
 61. Reichstag 74. Sitzung, 24 March 1906, 2268 (Wislow). Retrieved 6 April 2021 from <http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de>.
 62. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Dernburgs Studienreise durch Britisch- und Deutsch Südwestafrika!” 12 September 1908. See also Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 102.
 63. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Zur Swakopmunder Hafenfrage,” 18 August 1906; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Noch einmal die Swakopmunder Hafenfrage,” 22 August 1906; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Schiffahrt im Swakopmund Hafen,” 15 September 1906.
 64. Aktenstück zu Nr. 622, Entwicklung der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee. Retrieved 12 March 2021 from www.reichstagsprotokolle.de. At least according to Kummer, future updates need take nature into account. See *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Noch einmal die Swakopmunder Hafenfrage,” 22 August 1906.
 65. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus Swakopmund,” 6 March 1907. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Die Landungsbrücke in Swakopmund,” 13 March 1907; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus Swakopmund,” 6 March 1907.
 66. Jahresbericht über die Entwicklung der Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee im Jahre 1906/07, Teil E.: Deutsch-Südwestafrika (Berlin, 1908), 18–19. See also “Chronik,” *Deutsche Bauzeitung* XLI, no. 33 (24 April 1907), 66.
 67. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus Swakopmund,” 6 March 1907.
 68. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Der Swakopmunder Hafenbau, I,” 18 January 1908.
 69. Reichstag, 127 Sitzung, 20 March 1908. Retrieved 6 April 2021 from www.reichstagsprotokolle.de. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Der Swakopmunder Hafenbau, I,” 18 January 1908; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Der Swakopmunder Hafenbau, II,” 25 January 1908; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Zum Hafenbau in Swakopmund, I,” 16 September 1908; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Zum Hafenbau in Swakopmund, II,” 19 September 1908; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Mole und Eisenbahn,” 12 October 1907; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*,

- “Die neusten Kabelmeldungen,” 21 March 1908; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Der Swakopmunder Brückenbau,” 20 May 1908. For discussion regarding Walvis Bay see *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Walfischbay endlich ausgeschaltet,” 27 June 1908; Connemann, “Hafenanlage in Swakopmund,” *Annalen der Hydrographie und Maritimen Meteorologie*, June 1910, 304–6, “Häfen, Kanäle etc.,” *Schiffbau*, 25 November 1908, 142–44.
70. BArch-B, R 43/927, Bericht, von Lindequist an von Bülow, 25 October 1907.
 71. Nick Middleton, *Deserts: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2009), 36–39.
 72. Goudie and Viles, *Landscapes and Landforms of Namibia*, 122. See also Erich Krenkel, *Geologie der Deutschen Kolonien in Afrika* (Leipzig, 1939), 164.
 73. *Lüderitzbuchter Zeitung*, “Die Festlegung und Bepflanzung der Wanderdünen,” 6 January 1912. See also *Lüderitzbuchter Zeitung*, “Die Bepflanzung der Wanderdünen in der südlichen Namib,” 23 December 1911.
 74. Lindner, *Koloniale Begegnungen*, 252–53.
 75. *Die Woermann-Linie während des Aufstandes in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika*, 31.
 76. Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 106; *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Deutsch-Südwestafrika. Lüderitzbucht,” 8 July 1905. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus Lüderitzbucht,” 30 August 1905; *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Südwestafrika: Die Wasserversorgung von Lüderitzbucht,” 23 September 1905; *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Südwestafrika: Wasserstelle Anichab,” 21 October 1905; *Windhuker Nachrichten*, “Zwischen Lüderitzbucht und Kubub,” 25 October 1905; Hauptmann Schulze, “Zwischen Lüderitzbucht und Kubub,” in *Mitteilungen von Forschungsreisenden und Gelehrten aus den Deutschen Schutzgebieten*, ed. Freiherr von Danckelman, 257–73, here 260 (Berlin, 1906).
 77. Wipplinger, “Sea Water Distillation Plant at Lüderitz,” 281. See also Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 106; Press, *Blood and Diamonds*, 27.
 78. NAN, ZBU, 1454 P.V.E.3, Kondensator Lüderitzbucht 1904–1907, letter, 24 November 1906.
 79. NAN, ZBU, 1454 P.V.E.3, Kondensator Lüderitzbucht 1904–1907, report, 12 October 1906. For subsequent arguments see NAN, ZBU, 1454 P.V.E.3, Kondensator Lüderitzbucht 1904–1907, letters 28 December 1906, 29 December 1906, 14 May 1907, and 20 June 1907. See also NAN, ZBU 1454 P.V.E.3, (Vol. 2), Kondensator Lüderitzbucht 1907–1908, letters 29 July 1907; NAN, 1454 P.V.E.3, (Vol. 3), Kondensator Lüderitzbucht 1908–1909.
 80. NAN, ZBU 1454 P.V.E.3, Kondensator Lüderitzbucht 1904–1907, letter 17 February 1907.
 81. Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 107.
 82. *Die Woermann-Linie während des Aufstandes in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika*, 32, accessible at the Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt am Main.
 83. *Windhuker Nachrichten*, “Die Eisenbahntruppe in Südwestafrika,” 6 December 1906. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Die Eisenbahntruppe in Südwestafrika,” 26 September 1906.
 84. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus dem Schutzgebiet,” 31 May 1905. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Aus dem Schutzgebiet,” 19 July 1905.
 85. Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 109. See also Schulze, “Zwischen Lüderitzbucht und Kubub (mit 1 Skizze und 38 Abbildungen),”

- 258; *Windhuker Nachrichten*, “Zwischen Lüderitzbucht und Kubub,” 25 October 1905; *Die Woermann-Linie während des Aufstandes in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika*, 32; *Lüderitzbucht-Zeitung*, “Fünfzig Jahre Lüderitzbucht,” 8 April 1933, included in *Lüderitzbucht damals und gestern*; Hafenbautechnische Gesellschaft, *Die Deutsche Kolonialhäfen*, 36; Kaulich, *Die Geschichte der ehemaligen Kolonie Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, 466.
86. Missionary Laaf’s eyewitness report, Chronicle of the Lüderitz Community, Archives of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia (AELCRN) V. 16, 21–26, as quoted in “War, Concentration Camps and Genocide in South-West Africa,” 54, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*.
87. NAN, HBS 52, November 28, 1906, as referenced in Casper W. Erichsen, “Forced Labour in the Concentration Camp on Shark Island,” 91–92, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*.
88. Erichsen, “Forced Labor in the Concentration Camp of Shark Island,” 93, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in South-West Africa*. See also Stabsarzt Bofinger, “Einige Mitteilungen über Skorbut,” *Deutsche Militärärztliche Zeitschrift* 39, no. 15 (5 August 1910). Kreienbaum is less critical. Kreienbaum, “*Ein trauriges Fiasko*,” 242 and 247.
89. *Cape Argus*, 28 September 1905. “In German S.W. Africa: Further Startling Allegations: Horrible Cruelty: British Subjects and Combatants,” as quoted in “Forced Labor in the Concentration Camp of Shark Island,” 85, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in South-West Africa*.
90. Erichsen, *What the Elders Used to Say*, 26–27.
91. Erichsen, “Forced Labor in the Concentration Camp of Shark Island,” 90, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in South-West Africa*.
92. *Ibid.*, 84.
93. Rheinische Missions-Berichte (RMS), V.16, 1–31, Chronicle for Lüderitzbucht, as referenced in Erichsen, “*The Angel of Death Has Descended Violently among Them*,” 126. See also Rheinische Missions-Berichte (RMS), V.16, 1–31, Chronicle for Lüderitzbucht, as referenced in Erichsen, “*The Angel of Death Has Descended Violently among Them*,” 126.
94. Karl Laaf, Jahresbericht 1906, November 22, 1906, Archiv der Vereinigten Evangelische Mission (AVEM), RMG, 2.509a, Bl. 354–359, as referenced in Kreienbaum, “*Ein trauriges Fiasko*,” 234.
95. Letter of Samuel Kariko to Eich (in Otjiherero), March 3, 1907, ELCRN, II.1.9, as quoted in Kreienbaum, “*Ein trauriges Fiasko*,” 228.
96. Silvester and Gewalt, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 172. Although this *Blue Book* was a propaganda tool aiming to degrade German colonial rule, it is “a prime source material presenting an early African perspective on the particular features of colonial genocide.” Silvester and Gewalt, *Words Cannot Be Found*, xxxiii.
97. Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser’s Holocaust*, 215–16, reference of diary NAN, HBS, 52, 28 November 1906
98. NAN, HBS 52, 24 December 1906, as quoted in “Forced Labor in the Concentration Camp of Shark Island,” in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in South-West Africa*, 92.
99. NAN, ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, 116, as referenced in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in South-West Africa*, 95.
100. *Ibid.*, 89. See also Caspar W. Erichsen, “Namibia’s Island of Death,” *New African* (2003): 46–49.

101. Matthias Häussler and Trutz von Trotha, "Brutalisierung 'von unten': Kleiner Krieg, Entgrenzung der Gewalt und Genozid im kolonialen Deutsch-Südwestafrika," *Mittelweg* 36 21, no. 3 (2012): 57–89, here 89.
102. Zimmerer, "War, Concentration Camps and Genocide in German South-West-Africa," 56, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*. See also Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner*, 47.
103. Casper W. Erichsen and Jeremy Silvester. Retrieved 6 April 2021 from <http://www.namibian.org/travel/namibia/luderitzcc.html>.
104. Heinrich Vedder, *Kurze Geschichten aus einem langen Leben* (Wuppertal-Barmen, 1953), 139, as quote in Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 209–10.
105. ZBU 456, D. IV.1.3. Vol. 5, 19 June 1907, 98, as quoted in Erichsen, "The Angel of Death Has Descended Violently among Them," 76.
106. Imp. Col. Off. File No. 2090, 100, von Lindequist's memorandum of 12 Dec. 1906 cited in Drechsler, "Let Us Die Fighting," 211.
107. Kuhlmann, Bericht über eine Reise nach Lüderitzbucht, 10 August 1905, AVEM, RMG 1.644a, Bl. 33–41, as referenced in Kreienbaum, "Ein trauriges Fiasko," 259.
108. Carl Otto, *Südwest-Afrika: Wohin steuern wir? Ein nationaler Notschrei und Anderes* (Berlin, 1906), 11. See also Schanz, *West-Afrika*, 365. For an earlier description (1902), see Afrikaner, "Von Angra Pequena nach Keetmanshoop: Eine Reise in Deutsch-Südwestafrika," *Die Illustrierte Welt: Blätter aus Natur und Leben, Wissenschaft und Kunst zur Unterhaltung und Belehrung für die Familie, für Alle und Jeden* (1902), 180–82.
109. *Südwest*, "Tod in den Dünen," 7 June 1911 (Linck).
110. Quiring, *Die Eisenbahnen Deutsch-Südwestafrikas und ihre Bedeutung für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Kolonie* (Borna-Leipzig, 1911), 21. Discussions often circled around the water question. See NAN, HBS, St. Unit 1, File 1/2, Bericht, 31 March 1901.
111. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "In den Wanderdünen Deutsch-Südwestafrikas," 6 March 1902.
112. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Rundschau. Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Weg von Lüderitzbucht ins Innere," 28 May 1903; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus dem Süden," 3 April 1903; Schwabe, "Ueber die Hafens- und Eisenbahnbauten in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika," 66; NAN, HBS, St. Unit 1, File 1/2 (Allgemeiner generelle Verhandlungen und Verfügungen den Hafenbau betreff. 1898–1902), Report, 9 November 1900; Baumgarten, *Deutsch-Afrika und seine Nachbarn im schwarzen Erdteil*, 432.
113. NAN, HBS, St. Unit 1, File 1/2, Allgemeiner generelle Verhandlungen und Verfügungen den Hafenbau betreffend, 1898–1902, "Militärischer Bericht" der S.M.S. Wolf, 9 November 1900.
114. BArch-B, R 1001/8537 Kamele in Deutsch-Südwestafrika—Beschaffung von Kamelen Juni 1900—Nov. 1907, Band 3, telegram, von Trotha an Auswärtiges Amt (Kolonialabteilung), 22 Feb. 1905. See also Kaulich, *Geschichte Deutsch-Südwestafrikas*, 374.
115. Richard Trevor Wilson, "The One-Humped Camel in Southern Africa: Imports and Use in South West Africa/Namibia," *Journal of Camel Practice and Research* 19, no. 1 (2012): 1–6, here 2. See also Semler, *Meine Beobachtungen in Süd-West-Afrika*, 27–28.
116. Drechsler, "Let Us Die Fighting," 222.
117. Kaulich, *Die Geschichte der ehemaligen Kolonie Deutsch-Südwest*, 447. See also *Zeitung des Vereins Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen*, "Der Bau einer Eisenbahn von

- Lüderitzbucht nach Kubub," XLV, no. 67 (30 August 1905). One scholar estimated the price tag using the southern *Baiweg* (bay way) to about 40 million Marks per year. See Klaus Dierks, "Schmalspurreisenbahnen erschließen Afrikas letzte Wildnis: Namibia's Schienenverkehr zwischen Aufbau und Rückgang," in Becker and Hecker, *1884–1984*, 347–65, here 356.
118. *Zeitung des Vereins Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen*, "Die Bahn Lüderitzbucht-Kubub," XLV, no. 99 (20 December 1905). See also Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 111.
 119. *Windhuker Nachrichten*, "Zwischen Lüderitzbucht und Kubub," 1 November 1906. See also *Zeitung des Vereins Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen* XLVI, no. 86, "Die Bahn von Lüderitzbucht nach Kubub," 7 November 1906.
 120. Semler, *Meine Beobachtungen in Süd-West-Afrika*, 3.
 121. *Kladderdatsch, humoristisch-satirisches Wochenblatt*, "Briefkasten," 3 September 1905.
 122. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Die Fischflussbrücken," 27 February 1909.
 123. Wilson, "The One-Humped Camel in Southern Africa," 1–6, here 2.
 124. Schwabe, "Der Eisenbahnbau in unseren afrikanischen Schutzgebieten," 7.
 125. Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 113 and 119–21. See also *Zeitung des Vereins Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen* XLVI, no. 71 "Eisenbahnbau Lüderitzbucht-Kubub," 15 September 1906; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Lüderitzbucht," 14 March 1906; "Zwischen Lüderitzbucht und Kubub: Von Hauptmann Schulze, Führer der ersten Eienenbahn-Baukompagnie (mit 1 Skizze und 38 Abbildungen)," 257–73, here addendum, in *Mittheilungen von Forschungsreisenden und Gelehrten* (1906).
 126. Hermann Schwabe, "Der Eisenbahnbau in unseren afrikanischen Schutzgebieten," *Deutsche Bauzeitung* XLI, no. 1 (2 January 1907), 6–7, here 7. See also: Quiring, *Die Eisenbahnen Deutsch-Südwestafrikas*, 22–23 and 26.
 127. Semler, *Meine Beobachtungen in Süd-West-Afrika*, 12. Black workers also blasted away rocks. Semler, *Meine Beobachtungen in Süd-West-Afrika*, 13. According to one newspaper, "The demand for workers has been met by ordering indigenous people, though whites are also utilized for specific tasks." See *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, "Von der Lüderitzbucht-Eisenbahn in Deutsch-Südwestafrika," 1 April 1906. See also *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, "Von der Lüderitzbucht-Eisenbahn in Deutsch-Südwestafrika," 1 July 1906; Erichsen, "The Angel of Death Has Descended Violently among Them," 38.
 128. Quiring, *Die Eisenbahnen Deutsch-Südwestafrikas*, 26.
 129. *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, "Deutsch-Südwestafrika. Von der Südbahn," 15 December 1908. See also Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 203.
 130. TNA, CO 879/94/4 Further Correspondence [1907] relating to Affairs of Walfisch Bay and the German-Southwest African Protectorate, no. 128, enclosure (British Embassy 22 April 1907, signed Colonel F. Trench). See also Jahresbericht 1905/06, 67, as referenced in *Die Geschichte der ehemaligen Kolonie Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, 448; Silvester and Gewalt, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 171n155.
 131. F. Trench (21 November 1906), as quoted in Silvester and Gewalt, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 171n156. See also Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 125
 132. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Lüderitzbuchter Brief," 20 April 1907. See also Semler, *Meine Beobachtungen in Süd-West-Afrika*, 7–8.
 133. Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 203.

134. Corporations did not pay their workers—they paid the local government instead, 50 Pfennig per day per worker Abschrift einer Verfügung des Etappenkommandos, 29 March 1905, NAN, BWI 406 E.V.8 Generalia, Bl. 3f, as referenced in Kreienbaum, “*Ein trauriges Fiasko*,” 250.
135. Klaus Dierks 2.0. Retrieved 20 June 2020 from http://www.klausdierks.com/Namibia_Rail/2.htm. See also Olsuoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser’s Holocaust*, 204–5; Erichsen, “*The Angel of Death Has Descended Violently among Them*,” 59 and 133; Kreienbaum, “*Ein trauriges Fiasko*,” 249–54.
136. Klaus Dierks, *||Khauxa!nas* (Windhoek, 1992), 39.
137. Tilman Dederling, “War and Mobility in the Borderlands of South Western Africa in the Early Twentieth Century,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 39, no. 2 (2006): 275–94.
138. Dierks, *||Khauxa!nas*, 18. Retrieved 14 March 2021 from <http://www.klausdierks.com/Khauxanas/4.htm>. Peter Curson, *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony: Jakob Marengo and the Untold Tragedy of Edward Presgrave* (Bury St. Edmunds, 2012), 56–67.
139. Dierks, *||Khauxa!nas*, 12.
140. *Ibid.*, 42. See also Masson, *Jakob Marengo*, 28.
141. Dierks, *||Khauxa!nas*, 42.
142. Masson, *Jakob Marengo*, 35. Masson refers to Schans Vlakte nearby.
143. Dierks, *||Khauxa!nas*, 51.
144. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Zur Eisenbahnfrage,” 16 May 1906.
145. BArch-B, R 34/926, Denkschrift betreffend den Weiterbau der Eisenbahn Lüderitzbucht-Aus (Kubub) bis Keetmanshoop.
146. BArch-B, R 34/926, Denkschrift des Generalstabes der Armee über den Bahnbau Aus (Kubub) Keetmanshoop. See also *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, “Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Die dringende Notwendigkeit des Eisenbahnbaus Lüderitzbucht–Keetmanshoop,” 15 December 1906.
147. Laak, *Imperiale Infrastruktur*, 128.
148. Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 121.
149. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, “Wassererschliessungsarbeiten,” 10 January 1907. See also Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 124. This was one of the spots marked by dowser von Uslar. See Hans Berthold, “Eine Fahrt auf der Eisenbahn Lüderitzbucht-Keetmanshoop: Reisebrief unsres nach den westafrikanischen Kolonien entsandten Berichterstatters,” *Kolonie und Heimat*, 23 May 1908.
150. NAN, 28671, Construction of the railway line Lüderitzbucht-Keetmanshoop, 1906. Female workers (probably prisoners of war) carrying stones for railway dam on their heads [1906].
151. Baltzer, *Die Kolonialbahnen*, 86–88. See also Kaulich, *Die Geschichte der ehemaligen Kolonie Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, 448–49; Jäschke, *Die polyzentrische Infrastruktur Namibias*, 143; Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 126–27.
152. *Lüderitzbuchter Zeitung*, “Die Festlegung und Bepflanzung der Wanderdünen,” 6 January 1912.
153. Semler, *Meine Beobachtungen in Süd-West-Afrika*, 9.

154. *Lüderitzbuchter Zeitung*, “Die Festlegung und Bepflanzung der Wanderdünen,” 6 January 1912; *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, “Von der Lüderitzbucht-Eisenbahn in Deutsch-Südwestafrika,” 1 July 1906.
155. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Der Bahnbau durch die Wanderdünen,” 4 April 1908.
156. *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, “Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Vom Bau der Lüderitzbucht-Eisenbahn,” 15 September 1906. See also Berthold von Deimling, *Südwestafrika: Land und Leute, unsere Kämpfe Wert der Kolonie: Vortrag gehalten in einer Anzahl deutscher Städte* (Berlin, 1906), 26; Semler, *Meine Beobachtungen in Süd-West-Afrika*, 9.
157. Baltzer, “Dünenbefestigung,” 481, in *Deutsches Koloniallexikon*, I.
158. *Der Tropenpflanzer* XI, no. 12, “Dünenbau in Deutsch-Südwestafrika,” December 1907.
159. NAN, 28715, Construction of the railway line Lüderitzbucht-Keetmanshoop. Experimental garden for dune fixation at km 22, 23 Oct 1907.
160. *Der Tropenpflanzer* XI, no. 12, “Dünenbau in Deutsch-Südwestafrika,” December 1907.
161. NAN, ZBU, 1884–1915 (Vol. 1), 1762, T.VII.G I, Hafen Lüderitzbucht, Allgemeines (Projekte- und Vorarbeiten) (1906–1908), letter 27 November 1906.
162. CO 879/94/4 Further Correspondence [1907] relating to Affairs of Walfisch Bay and the German-Southwest African Protectorate, 1907 (British Embassy 22 April 1907, signed Colonel F. Trench). See also Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, 35.
163. *Der Tropenpflanzer* XI, no. 12, “Dünenbau in Deutsch-Südwestafrika,” December 1907.
164. Lau and Reiner, *100 Years of Agricultural Development in Colonial Namibia*, 7. See also BArch-B, R 1001/8534, Kamele in Deutsch-Südwestafrika Dez. 1902–März 1914, report, 7 May 1908.
165. *Kolonie und Heimat*, “Baut Eisenbahnen in unsern Kolonien,” 29 March 1908. See also Hans Berthold, “Eine Fahrt auf der Eisenbahn Lüderitzbucht-Keetmanshoop. Reisebrief unsres nach den westafrikanischen Kolonien entsandten Berichterstatters,” *Kolonie und Heimat*, 23 May 1908.
166. *Kolonie und Heimat* II, no. 1, “Zur Eröffnung der Eisenbahn Lüderitzbucht–Keetmanshoop,” 1 October 1908. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, “Der Bahnbau durch die Wanderdünen,” 4 April 1908.
167. Paul Kolbe, *Unsere Helden in Südwestafrika* (Leipzig, 1907), 121.
168. *Lüderitzbuchter Zeitung*, “Die Bepflanzung der Wanderdünen in der südlichen Namib,” 23 December 1911; *Lüderitzbuchter Zeitung*, “Die Festlegung und Bepflanzung der Wanderdünen,” 6 January 1912. See also Quiring, *Die Eisenbahnen Deutsch-Südwestafrikas*, 22; *Lüderitzbuchter Zeitung*, “Die Festlegung und Bepflanzung der Wanderdünen,” 6 January 1912.
169. Reichs-Kolonialamt, ed., *Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und Südsee, 1911/12: Amtliche Jahresberichte* (Berlin, 1913), 138.
170. *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, “Deutsch-Südwestafrika. Die Betriebsergebnisse der Südbahn in Deutsch-Südwestafrika und des Landungsbetriebes in Robertshafen im Rechnungsjahr 1910,” 1 October 1911.
171. Drechsler, “*Let Us Die Fighting*,” 203. See also Haacke, “The Kalahari Expedition, March 1908.”

172. Haacke, "The Kalahari Expedition, March 1908," 2. See also Siegfried Passarge, *Die Buschmänner der Kalahari* (Berlin, 1907), 68–69.
173. Jan N̄arewe Kundeb, "Tsamma Melons and Wild Cucumbers Were Our Water," in *!Qamtee aa xanya : 'The Book of Traditions': Histories, Texts and Illustrations from the !Xoon and !Nohan People of Namibia*, ed. Gertrud Boden, 22 (Basel, 2008). The wild cucumber could be *Cucumis africanus* or *gemsbok cucumber* (*Acanthosicyos naudinianus*).
174. Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung I des Grossen Generalstabes, ed., *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika: Sechstes Heft: Der Hottentottenkrieg* (Berlin, 1907), 361. Walter Nuhn, *Feind überall: Der große Nama-Aufstand (Hottentottenaufstand) 1904–1908 in Deutsch-Südwestafrika (Namibia): der erste Partisanenkrieg in der Geschichte der deutschen Armee* (Bonn, 2000), 185; Bühler, *Der Namaaufstand gegen die deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Namibia von 1904–1913*, 320.
175. Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe in Südwestafrika, Ostafrika und Südafrika 1894–1910*, 137.
176. Ibid.
177. Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung I des Grossen Generalstabes, ed., *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika: Sechstes Heft*, 362.
178. TNA, CO 879/94/4 Further Correspondence [1907] relating to Affairs of Walfisch Bay and the German-Southwest African Protectorate, no. 234, enclosure 5 (Inspector Harvey, Upington, to Commissioner, Cape, Mounted Police, Cape Town telegram). See also Masson, "A Fragment of Colonial History," 247–56.
179. Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, 10.
180. Bühler, *Der Namaaufstand gegen die deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Namibia von 1904–1913*, 322.
181. Nuhn calls it the first partisan war for the German army overall. Nuhn, *Feind überall*.
182. Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein*, 95–96.
183. Henkel, *Der Kampf um Südwestafrika*, 83.
184. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Der deutsche Reichstag und das südwestafrikanische Schmerzenskind," 11 May 1904 (Rust).
185. Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, 68–69. See also Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein*.
186. Miescher, *Namibia's Red Line*, 56.
187. Gottfried Goldberg, "Die verkehrstechnische und kommerzielle Lage der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und Asien," *Verkehrstechnische Woche und Eisenbahntechnische Zeitschrift* III, no. 3 (17 October 1908). See also Fritz Emunds, *Zum Gedenkblatt. 1904–1907. Lebensdaten der auf dem Ehrenfelde D.-Südwestafrikas gebliebenen Offiziere* (Trier, 1907).
188. August Seidel, *Unsere Kolonien: Was sind sie wert und wie können wir sie erschliessen? Ein Kolonialprogramm* (Leipzig, 1905), 73–74.
189. Winfried Speitkamp, *Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte*, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart, 214), 135.
190. Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railways in Namibia*, 131.
191. Paul Gentz, *Deutschland und England in Südafrika: Vergleich der Kriegsführung und der Erfolge beider Staaten in ihren südafrikanischen Kolonialkriegen* (Berlin, 1905), 708.
192. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Nach 25 Jahren," 24 April 1908.
193. Kundrus, *Modern Imperialisten*, 56.

194. Eugen Wolf, *Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Ein offenes Wort* (Kempten, 1905), n.p.
195. Unz-Zehlendorf, *Deutschlands Pflichten in Südwestafrika* (Stuttgart, 1908), 3.
196. Ferdinand Wohltmann, *Unsere Lage und Aussichten in der Kolonie Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Ein offenes Wort* (Bonn, 1905), 40, as quoted in Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten*, 57.
197. Henkel, *Der Kampf um Südwestafrika*, 180.
198. *Ibid.*, 181.
199. *Ibid.*, 180.
200. Gewalt, *Herero Heroes*, 193.
201. Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting*, 209.
202. Union of South Africa (1918), Report on the natives of South-West-Africa and their treatment by Germany, London, HMSO, 103, as referenced in Erichsen, "The Angel of Death has Descended Violently among Them," 49.
203. Erichsen, "The Angel of Death Has Descended Violently among Them," 120. See also Matthias Häussler, "Zwischen Vernichtung und Pardon: Die Konzentrationslager in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1904–1908," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 61, no. 7/8 (2013): 601–20, here 607.
204. BArch-B, R 1001/1200, Landerwerbungen und Aufgebote von Landansprüchen, Auswärtiges Amt/ Kolonialabteilung, Brief 27 August 1904. See also BArch-B, R 1001/1141, Ansiedlung insbesondere deutscher Bauern, Kaisl. Dt. Gouvernement für Südwestafrika, Brief, 24 July 1906.
205. BArch-B, R 1001/1220, Entziehung von Vermögen von Eingeborenen in Deutsch-Südwestafrika. Kaiserlich Deutsches Gouvernement für Südwestafrika, von Lindequist Brief, 25 April 1906.
206. Ute Dieckmann. *Hai||om in the Etosha Region: A History of Colonial Settlement, Ethnicity and Nature Conservation* (Basel, 2007), 99. Von Lindequist's creation of a large Wildschutzgebiete game reserve in March 1907 meant to control white elephant hunters seemed to have little impact on native hunting practices. See Bollig, *Shaping the African Savannah*, 108.
207. Historian Drechsler titled the postwar period "The Peace of the Graveyard (1907–15)," a description reimagined by historian Prein. See Drechsler, "Let Us Die Fighting," 231. Philipp Prein, "Guns and Top Hats: African Resistance in German South West Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20, no 1 (1994): 99–121.